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1. The Dilemma of Heterogeneity
   First, I would like to consider some methodological issues that must be 
addressed if one attempts to develop a general theory from interpretations grounded 
in the analysis of a localized subject. In the case I will examine, that of Japan, 
social scientific analysis inevitably falls into what may be called the "dilemma of 
heterogeneity." This dilemma is a product of the intellectual environment that has 
defined Japanese social science research since the Meiji period. 
   The social sciences originated in Europe as a means of understanding the social 
and historical changes that occurred as a result of modernity, itself a concept with 
a strongly European flavor. New analytical approaches were developed within a 
context that was specifically European, and the terms of analysis were-necessarily 
because of the experience of those who devised them-European (and later North 
American). It is important for us to realize, I believe, that when the object of analysis 
is a different society (particularly a non-Western society such as Japan), and these 
approaches and terms are simply applied without allowing for local qualities, a 
slippage naturally occurs between theory and observable reality. If we choose to 
stand by the established theories, Japan will in many instances be viewed as an 
exceptional case. Conversely, if we distance ourselves from this social scientific 
tradition and apply theories meant exclusively for interpreting Japanese society, 
those theories may have little explanatory power outside of Japan. Thus our dilemma 
is that irrespective of whether we choose to rely on orthodox social scientific theories 
(whose claims to universality can be questioned because they incorporate so many 
social and historical characteristics of the West), or whether we rely on theories 
grounded in the experience of Japan, we end up with interpretations of Japan which 
stress heterogeneity. 
   The American political scientist and Japan specialist Chalmers Johnson, well 
known as the author of MITT and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford University Press,
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1982), points out that Western economic theories, whether neoclassical, Keynesian, 
or Marxian, are unable to successfully explain Japan's economic achievements. He 
notes that rather than attributing this failure to problems with their own theories, 
Western economists prefer to declare Japan an exception, using "cultural uniqueness" 
as a means of avoiding the issue, or else they manipulate the data on Japan to make 
it conform to the theories.' 
    Johnson's analysis is instructive. Logically, existing Western economic 
theories should be modified when they cannot adequately explain Japan's economic 
performance. What in fact happens, however, is that the data is manipulated, or 
emphasis is placed on Japan being an anomaly or marginal case that cannot be 
properly accommodated within the theories. In order to protect a presupposed 
universality, thus, instead of enhancing the universality of the theories by adjusting 
them to accommodate actual (but inconvenient) case studies, Japan's experience is 
excluded. 
    The reason given for inability to explain Japan's economic performance 
rationally within these theoretical frameworks is that Japanese behavior and values 
are anomalous. In other words, by stressing the heterogeneity or "uniqueness" of 
Japanese culture, the crisis of meeting a challenge to the universal applicability 
of the theories can be weathered. Or as has often been the case in Japanese social 
scientific analysis, social phenomena that are not present in the West have tended 
to be explained in terms of Japan's backwardness or as remnants of its feudal 
system.2 Attempts are thus made to regulate the slippage between theory and reality 
by emphasizing that these social phenomena observable uniquely in Japan have 
survived in a particular form from ancient times. 
   Of course a theory derived through a one-sided emphasis of reality will, by its 
very nature, inevitably produce discrepancies in the analysis of any society. Nakane 
Chie points out that while it is to be expected that discrepancies between theoretical 
models and reality will be evident in both the West and Japan, it is the nature of 
these discrepancies that is important. In other words, the quality of a discrepancy 
will differ depending on whether it appears in an area removed from the core of a 
problem, or whether it appears in a critical area.' 
   In order to analyze Japan under an independent theoretical framework, rather 
than relying on existing theories produced in the West, we must integrate the social 
and historical particularities of Japan into the core of the theory. To do otherwise will 
likely result in the slippage between theory and reality occurring in a critical area. 
Some slippage occurring at the margins can be accepted, I would argue, because
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it allows for analysis with only certain qualifications to the theory. But when the 
slippage occurs in a critical area, the limitations of the theory's applicability are 
exposed and it becomes clear that extensive modifications are required. 
   However, what we have actually been presented with are token explanations 
based on the argument that certain trends and attributes appearing as theoretical 
imperatives are lacking in the case of Japan. For example, if we assume a purely 
theoretical model-here I am thinking of civil society, individualism, political 
democracy, and the like-abstracted from the historical experiences of France 
and Britain and premised on the complete disappearance of feudalism, there will 
naturally be little discrepancy with the reality of the West. Conversely, however, 
with a country such as Japan, whose social and historical particularities were not 
absorbed during the theory-building stage, discrepancies will occur in areas critical 
to the theory. The token concepts used to argue that contemporary Japanese society 
derives from feudalism have been devised to account for such discrepancies. 
    In any country there remain signs of previous institutions. No society 
experiences clear-cut social change or a complete rupture with the past. Despite 
this, Japan alone is viewed theoretically as showing enduring signs of feudalism 
for the simple reason that its social idiosyncrasies have not been absorbed into the 
core of the theory. In other words, crucial areas cannot be adequately explained by 
the theory, yet the very absence of trends and attributes assumed by that theory is 
transformed into an explanatory principle that exemplifies the country in question. 
Here, the theory's inability to elucidate becomes an elucidation in itself. 
   During Japan's long, hard struggle to introduce various Western models over 
the last century, the reform of reality was inseparably intertwined with its analysis, 
and the shortcomings of the "absence viewpoint" methodology were not apparent 
(and therefore did not seem to require serious reconsideration). The idea was to 
reform reality by introducing from the West what was lacking in Japan; this, in 
itself, was often perceived as constituting an analysis of reality. However, the fact is 
that as long as Japan fails to have its own social sciences, the social and historical 
idiosyncrasies of Japan will remain outside the core of the theories, and the social 
scientific elucidation of Japan will remain unrealized.
2. Bureaucracy in Comparative Perspective
    The most powerful group in pre-war Japanese society was the bureaucracy. 
After the fall of the samurai as a class, it was the bureaucracy that took over the
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control and administration of Japan. In a break with the past, high positions in the 
bureaucracy were not gained through hereditary social rank, family connections, 
or wealth. The bureaucracy was based instead on meritocratic principles, with 
recruitment conducted through open competition and subsequent advancement 
determined by individual achievements. An analogue in Europe is the recruitment of 
the higher bureaucracy in France from the graduates of the Ecole Polytechnique. 
   In the early Meiji period, the bureaucrats came for the most part from the 
ranks of the samurai class, who had both the drive to devote themselves to the 
administration of the state and the educational background needed. During the 
1880s, men of samurai background comprised about seventy-five per cent of the 
graduates of the Law Faculty of the Imperial University (now the University of 
Tokyo), which then as now was the principal recruiting ground for the bureaucracy. 
Before long, however, a system of uniform and universal compulsory education was 
implemented throughout Japan, and this gradually reduced the gaps between the 
social classes. Fairly quickly it became ordinary for commoners to graduate from the 
university and then to become successful candidates for the bureaucrats. 
   During the 1890s, almost fifty per cent of those who passed the examination 
for admission to the higher levels of the bureaucracy (the Higher Civil Service 
Examination, instituted in 1894) were of samurai origin. By the end of the second 
decade of the twentieth century, the proportion had sunk to nearly twenty per 
cent. Since the former samurai class comprised only some six per cent of the total 
population of Japan, even a figure of twenty per cent can be described as over-
representation. But this was not a result of social discrimination; rather, it was the 
product of such factors as cultural motivation and levels of educational attainment. 
There was a great difference here from the situation in England, where alongside a 
system of open examinations for entrance to the administrative grades of the civil 
service, discrimination continued to be exercised under the guise of an interview 
system. 
   The bureaucracy achieved its unrivalled power in Japan not simply as a result of 
the centralization of powers in the modern Japanese state. As successful candidates 
who had passed open examinations designed to test their academic aptitude, they 
were in a sense an embodiment of the new meritocratic ideals, and this also was 
an important factor. In contrast to Great Britain and Germany, there were very few 
members of the aristocracy to be found in Japan's bureaucracy. This is a point worth 
noting. In Europe the recruitment of the bureaucracy and the military may well have 
been based on meritocratic principles, but European systems of education were
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anything but meritocratic and embodied a considerable amount of social segregation. 
This led to a state of affairs in which large numbers of administrative and military 
professionals were of aristocratic origins. In Japan, by contrast, since everybody 
received the same kind of education and since the competitive examinations were 
conducted on a fair and impartial basis, it was no easy matter for members of the 
aristocracy to pass the examinations for entrance to the bureaucracy. It was for these 
reasons that the Japanese bureaucracy, which was drawn from all classes of society, 
was able to establish itself as a powerful body. The social prestige of the bureaucracy 
was high, too-in court the bureau chief of a government ministry had precedence 
over a viscount (shishaku) or a baron (danshaku), and the Chief of the General Staff 
had precedence over a prince (koshaku). 
    The central government of Japan before the Second World War consisted of 
the Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Education, Agriculture and Commerce, Posts, 
Railways, War, Navy, and Home Ministries, with the last-named of these exercising 
a supervisory role over the population via the police and local government. 
Bureaucrats who had passed the Higher Civil Service Examination were given 
accelerated promotion after being assigned to one or another of these ministries, and 
their careers differed from those of the ordinary bureaucrats. They exercised their 
considerable powers with a sense of mission, a sense of belonging to an elite and 
pride at being involved in the running of the country. 
   In Japan, the Diet and the political parties have to be taken into consideration, 
too, in connection with the role of the bureaucracy. The existence of the party cabinet 
system, which only became established in the twentieth century, may suggest that 
the senior bureaucrats exist only to serve politicians faithfully. From 1900 through 
1945, however, twenty-seven of thirty Prime Ministers came from the bureaucracy. 
    The large number of ex-bureaucrats who became Prime Ministers can be 
explained by the eagerness of the political parties to enlist leading members of the 
bureaucracy as party leaders in the hope of extending their influence and power. 
Between the bureaucrats on the one hand and the industrialists, landowners, and 
journalists who constituted the bulk of the ordinary party politicians on the other, 
there were, of course, differences in ways of thinking and acting, but when it 
came to forming a cabinet and assuming responsibility for the governance of the 
country, there was plenty of room for a compromise to be worked out. The pre-war 
constitution, which was enacted in 1889, contains no mention of a party cabinet 
system. In the early years of its implementation, the Prime Minister was selected by a 
group of so-called Elder Statesmen, or Genro, and then confirmed in his appointment
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by the Emperor. And it was members of the bureaucracy rather than party politicians 
who enjoyed the confidence of the Genro when it came to selecting a Prime Minister. 
Therefore the majority parties in the Diet were eager to have at their head a powerful 
member of the bureaucracy, and it was in this way that members of the bureaucracy 
came to play an important role outside the bureaucracy itself. 
   These political traditions continued after the war, as well. Parties could not 
afford to ignore the talent and policy-planning abilities many bureaucrats had, and 
in consequence post-war cabinet positions have similarly been filled with former 
bureaucrats, including the post of Prime Minister. The generally poor quality of 
party politicians has been an important factor here, too. Ordinary Japanese citizens 
have wavered between opposition to bureaucratic types of organization and trust in 
the excellence of the bureaucracy itself. However, in recent years, in various aspects 
of its running of the country, bureaucrats have shown signs of incompetence and 
irresponsibility, and as a result the bureaucracy is now facing its greatest challenge 
since its formation in the Meiji period.
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